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ABSTRACT 
In 2012, ‘Gangnam Style’ occasioned large flash mobs, three of the early ones 
taking place in Pasadena, Times Square in New York, and Sydney, Australia. Today, 
Psy, the singer of ‘Gangnam Style’, is regularly talked about as having brought K-pop 
to the world beyond East and Southeast Asia, and Korean tourism chiefs are actively 
planning a Korean Wave street in Gangnam, the district of Seoul lampooned by the 
song. But, ‘Gangnam Style’ has proved challenging to K-pop fans, who have resisted 
its gender stereotyping, its comic framing, and its simple dance moves that subsume 
the aesthetics of movement under a sequence of locations and action vignettes. At the 
same time, foreign success has given the song, and its singer, legitimacy in Korea so 
much so that, despite lyrics and video images that critique modern urban life and 
caricature the misogynistic failures of its protagonist, Psy headlined the inauguration 
celebrations of Korea’s incoming president, Park Geun-hye, in February 2013. This 
paper explores the song, its reception and critique by fans and others, and notes how, 
in an ultimate paradox that reflects the age of social media and the individualization 
of consumerism, the parodies the song spawned across the globe enabled Koreans to 
celebrate its success while ignoring its message.  
Keywords: Korean Wave, K-pop, popular music, parody, mimesis, consumerism, 
social media, Gangnam Style, Psy. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2012, ‘Gangnam Style’ occasioned large flash mobs, three of the early 
ones taking place in Pasadena, Times Square in New York, and Sydney, Australia. 
Wikipedia lists additional flash mobs in October and November 2012 that each 
attracted between 12,000 and 20,000 participants in Seoul, Sulawesi, Milan, Paris 
and Rome. Psy (Park Jae-sang), the singer of ‘Gangnam Style’ has, not 
surprisingly, regularly been talked about as bringing K-pop to the world beyond 
East and Southeast Asia. He is said to have reinvigorated pop production, as having 
                                                 
∗ Professor, The School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.  
E-mail: kh@soas.ac.uk 
 Keith Howard 2 14 
succeeded abroad where others had failed. Certainly, Psy achieved massive 
international success: the song topped the charts in more than 30 countries, and by 
a large margin broke records on YouTube. The original video was the first to 
record one billion YouTube views, and by the end of May 2014 it had notched up 
two billion views; if consumers had watched the video only once, albeit in an 
imaginary world, this would mean that more than 25% of the global population had 
been reached.  
‘Gangnam Style’ has, however, proved challenging to K-pop fans, who have 
resisted its gender stereotyping, its comic framing, and its simple dance moves that 
subsume the aesthetics of movement beneath a sequence of locations and action 
vignettes. This seems paradoxical, if not counter-intuitive. However, in my 
teaching of K-pop, and in every recent guest seminar I have given on K-pop in 
Denmark, Germany, Britain and the United States, I have observed the same 
reluctance by students and audiences to embrace the song. Is it wise, then, that a 
number of my Korean Studies’ colleagues celebrate ‘Gangnam Style’ with their 
own parodies, and utilize the song’s lyrics in Korean language classes?  
While the ‘podgy comic singer and long-legged beauties’ (as the Korea 
Times put it in an article titled ‘Korea’s “soft power” quest’ on 5 December 2012) 
generated a ‘sudden attractiveness or sarcastic humor of an actor’s culture’ (Nye & 
Kim, 2013, 33), it was overseas fame that gave ‘Gangnam Style’ legitimacy back 
in Korea. Abroad, the paradox of the song, as both representing and sitting distant 
from contemporary K-pop, began to brew in the early days following the release of 
the song’s video on YouTube on 15 July 2012. One of the first parodies of it was 
contributed by the duo behind the ‘EatYourKimchi’ website, Simon and Martina 
Stawski. Copying many of the video ideas but providing a new soundtrack, this 
was uploaded to YouTube on 23 July 20121. Barely six weeks later, on  
3 September, the ‘EatYourKimchi’ duo announced on an Al-Jazeera television 
program that ‘Gangnam Style’ should not be associated with K-pop, and that while 
Psy deserved his popularity abroad for the song, it should not be thought of as part 
of Korean Wave2.  
This paper explores the song. I reflect on my own experiences as I have 
observed the evolution of K-pop in recent years, and as K-pop has moved beyond 
the accounts given in my 2006 edited text, Korean Pop Music: Riding the Wave. 
That volume, the first comprehensive account of Korean pop music in English, 
today seems to inhabit a different planet to ‘Gangnam Style’. I also reflect on the 
plethora of recent and competing accounts of both K-pop and ‘Gangnam Style’. In 
unpacking the paradox that is Psy’s – if not K-pop’s – most successful song, I find 
how the parodies it has spawned across the globe have enabled Koreans, including 
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Park Geun-Hye as the incoming South Korean president, to celebrate its success 
while ignoring its message. The song’s ultimate paradox, then, is that as a 
paramount reflection of our current age of social media and the individualization of 
consumerism, the song’s success has come from it being stripped of its identity – 
as a video, as a song with meaningful lyrics, and as something uniquely Korean. 
PRESIDENT PARK AND THE PODGY PSY 
‘Gangnam Style’ was most famously performed at the inauguration of Park 
Geun-hye as the incoming president of the Republic of Korea in February 2013. As 
a parody of modern urban life in Seoul with its hidden realities, and because the 
song marks its protagonist out as a failure, the inauguration performance marked 
the most counter-intuitive aspect of the song’s history. Had anybody working on 
the inauguration of the daughter of the general-turned-president Park Chung Hee 
considered the video images? Had they bothered to listen to the lyrics? Maybe we 
can forgive the most prominent English lyric element, ‘Hey, sexy lady!’ but surely 
not the first verse:  
Najenŭn ttasaroun in’ganjŏgin yŏja, 
Kŏp’i hanjan ŭi yŏyurŭl anŭn p’umgyŏk innŭn yŏja, 
Pami omyŏn shimjangi ttŭgŏwŏjinŭn yŏja, 
Kŭrŏn panjŏn innŭn yŏja… 
 
A girl who is warm and humanly during the day, 
A classy girl who knows how to enjoy the freedom of a cup of coffee, 
A girl whose heart gets hotter when night comes, 
A girl with that kind of twist… 
To those who remembered recent Korean history, this verse in no way 
matched the image of Park Geun-hye. In her youth, she had stepped up to the 
podium as de facto first lady after the assassination of her mother in August 1974 
by a Korean resident of Japan on orders reputedly issued by North Korean leader 
Kim Il Sung. To many, then, she was indelibly linked to her father’s autocratic and 
oppressive regime. She had cultivated an image of her life as one of sacrifice for 
the country: she had never married, almost unheard of among women of her 
generation she had studied electronic engineering at university in order to help the 
development of Korea’s industry, and she had been left with a prominent facial 
scar after an attack in 2006 while campaigning. Her political ambitions had been 
challenged many times, citing her ‘imperial’ and ‘queen-like’ persona. And, in 
2012, her successful presidential bid maintained a shift to the political right that 
had begun with her predecessor as president, the conservative Lee Myung-bak. 
Across the world, harnessing pop culture has proved to be an attractive 
proposition for many political campaigns. However, history has a habit of 
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repeating itself, and when an older generation of politicians attempts to tap in to the 
music of a younger generation, there are many dangers. Rarely do political 
strategists give the long-term implications sufficient consideration. To give two 
examples, D. Ream’s ‘Things Can Only Get Better’ was chosen by Tony Blair as 
the song for his 1997 campaign in Britain, and George W. Bush ran with Tom 
Petty’s ‘I Won’t Back Down’. Both songs proved useful on the campaign trail, 
since they offered pertinent reflections on the claimed shortcomings of 
administrations Blair and Bush hoped to replace. But both offered plenty of 
ammunition to detractors once both leaders had settled into office and began to be 
seen in the cold light of the morning after—or, rather, the many mornings after 
their election success. ‘Gangnam Style’ ought to occupy different territory to D: 
Ream and Tom Petty, since it makes no political points that can be interpreted as 
reflections on leaders previous or current. Neither does it reflect anything in the 
identity of the leader it was used to celebrate, a matter that points to a second 
common use of pop culture: as part of a strategy to enable politicians to appeal to 
youth constituencies. Here too, great care needs to be taken. One recent example of 
the possible pitfalls is offered in what The Telegraph cited on 21 April 2013 as the 
‘imbecilic, bum note’ ‘Koningslied’, a song put together for the accession of 
Willem-Alexander to the Dutch throne. This failed abysmally to capture people’s 
hearts, not least because it was too distant from any pop canon recognizable from 
the last decade or so.  
Why, then, given these observations, and knowing that K-pop fans had not 
universally embraced ‘Gangnam Style’, was it considered an appropriate song with 
which to celebrate Park Geun-hye’s inauguration? The answer has to be found 
beyond the lyrics, beyond the messages portrayed through visual imagery, and 
beyond the song’s musical style. Its performance at the inauguration can best be 
analyzed in terms of a potentialized mimetic power, as a kind of reverse Saidian 
Orientalism. In this understanding, the fame of the song in Korea was by the time 
of the inauguration based more on the parodies made of it beyond the borders of 
the Korean peninsula than on the original music video. Many of the parodies recast 
locations, individuals, and activities, and in so doing they dismantled the 
architecture of life in Korea. The result was that the literal meaning of the lyrics, 
and the intention of the original video’s scenes and vignettes, could be ignored.  
‘Gangnam Style’ broadly fits Theodor Adorno’s theorizing about pop music. 
Back in the 1940s, he decried the culture industry for having ‘synthetic, planned 
methods of turning out profits’ through ‘formulaic songs’ (Adorno & Horkheimer, 
1972). Adorno’s approach has been echoed by scholars such as Steve Chapple & 
Reebee Garofalo (1977), Dave Harker (1980) and Peter Manuel (1988), who 
variously and collectively have discussed the pop industry as being an ‘assembly 
line’ based on ‘pre-masticated formulae’ that ‘colonizes leisure’. ‘Gangnam Style’ 
is constructed using formulae, and can be allied to other recent assembly-line 
productions such as Los del Río’s ‘Macarena’, LMFAO’s ‘Sexy and I Know It’ or 
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any of the ‘Harlem Shakes’. All of these focus on visual and movement elements, 
in a way that relegates the lyrics to a supporting role; they are designed for video 
and, in the contemporary world, for Internet dissemination. ‘Gangnam Style’ is 
also formulaic in terms of its lyrics, which seem to revisit an earlier time in Korean 
pop history. It can be considered alongside Byeon Jin Seop’s ‘Hŭimang 
sahang/Wish List’, which was Number 5 in the Music Box charts on 9 February 
1990 at a time when nobody outside the country knew that Korea had a local pop 
chart. Byeon’s song includes the following: 
Ch’ŏng pajiga chal ŏullinŭn yŏja, 
Pabŭl manhi mŏgŏdo pae annaonŭn yŏja, 
Nae yegiga chaemiŏpsŏdo usŏjunŭn yŏja, 
Nan kŭrŏn yŏjaga chohtŏra… 
The woman who looks good in blue jeans, 
The woman who, although she eats lots, never gets a stomach that sticks out,  
The woman who laughs at all my stories even when she’s not interested in them, 
That’s the woman who is good for me… 
Byeon’s song title has sometimes been translated as ‘Wishful Thinking’; my use of 
‘Wish List’ dates from the time that my Korean language teacher at Yonsei 
University used the song with the class I was attending to practice our translation 
skills – much as Korean language teachers in the last few years have used the lyrics 
of ‘Gangnam Style’.  
‘Wish List’, however, was 25 years ago. It worked in the conservative era 
that preceded democratization proper in Korea, and appealed to parents more than 
to their teenage children, and to a media that was not yet vigilant about possible 
copyright infringement3. In 1990, I had just begun to research Korean pop music, 
and I quickly discovered that the song was controversial among its intended 
teenage audience; in fact, it arguably never actually gained a significant teenage 
fan base, because it failed to match teenage ideas about relationships and love. The 
song was about an ideal woman, a woman that could only be dreamt about. In the 
song, the male protagonist got his come-uppance when the woman of his dreams 
responded, saying – slowing the tempo down and modulating the song up a tone – 
that she could only be seen with a guy as great as the woman he had described.  
The parallels with ‘Gangnam Style’ are highly tempting. Psy, similarly, 
singularly fails in his attempts to attract the girls, not least as he sings how he 
might seem calm but gets completely crazy when the ‘right time’ comes, and how 
he has ideas rather than muscles. These are not the lyrics and not the image – given 
the 36-year-old Psy here singing his eighteenth single, the opening track on his 
sixth album – that we have come to expect from recent K-pop. In reality, then, 
‘Gangnam Style’ is evocative of a previous era.  
                                                 
3 Notwithstanding that Korea signed up to international copyright conventions in 1985, ‘Wish 
List’ includes the famous piano line from George Gershwin’s ‘Rhapsody in Blue’, written in 1924. 
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SEXUAL POLITICS AND K-POP 
The popularity of ‘Gangnam Style’ was such that it held on to top spot in 
almost every domestic Korean music chart from its release in July 2012 until Psy 
stopped his official promotion activities in February 2013. On the KBS Music 
Bank K-Chart, it took the top spot for 16 consecutive weeks through to January 
2013, based on digital streaming and downloads. Still, it was very different from 
much contemporary K-pop production. The overt sexuality of singers has, for 
example, increased markedly since rippling muscles were made a feature of K-Pop 
males by the dancing duo CLON in the 1990s (Howard, 2013). By 2014, the Asian 
male body was epitomized by Gary in his ‘Shower Later/Chogŭm itta shawŏhae’ 
and by the heavy rock of YB’s cover of ‘Cigarette Girl.’ In both, not to pull any 
punches, Asian males entwine with white, Euro-American and sexually 
provocative muses4. None of this sits well against the podgy Psy. Neither does Psy 
match the made-up, surgically enhanced, alternative metrosexuality that has made 
inroads into K-Pop with, say, BEAST’s 2010 track ‘Breath/Sum,’ or, before this 
with Rain – a ‘man’s body with a boy’s face,’ or ‘an angelic face and a killer body’ 
(Shin, 2009, cited in Youna Kim, 2013, 20). Curiously, though, by featuring strong 
male Korean stars, ‘Shower Later’ and ‘Cigarette Girl’ subvert the gender 
stereotyping that has existed in the West for several centuries, in which Asian 
female sexuality is celebrated but the Asian male is perceived to be weak and 
sexually non-threatening. These stereotypes are witnessed in Paul Gauguin’s 
canvasses or in the much-cited critique by Edward Said of Gustave Flaubert and 
Richard Burton, for their association of ‘the Orient [with] the freedom of licentious 
sex’ (1978, 190). 
These same stereotypes are constantly spoon-fed to grateful American 
consumers by the entertainment media (Wu, 2002; Prasso, 2005; Jung, 2013). 
‘Gangnam Style’ doesn’t seek to subvert them, but returns us to the same outdated 
images. Indeed, Psy takes on a much more mundane masculinity than 
contemporary mainstream K-pop. In the song’s video, his rotund physique 
contrasts with the toned bodies of the exercising girls he might just get lucky with, 
and with Hyuna pole-dancing on a subway train; while the lyrics allude to girls 
who are conservative on the outside but passionate inside, the video portrays the 
opposite. ‘Ironically’, writes Eun-Young Jung, emphasizing this same point, ‘such 
entanglements may have partially helped Psy to be successful in the United States, 
as visual images of Psy… [and] the two male comedians dancing wildly fit with the 
familiar stereotype of Asian males as sexually unthreatening and comical’ (2013, 107).  
That Psy stands as the antithesis of contemporary sexualized K-Pop is not 
restricted to ‘Gangnam Style’. Almost as if he was trying to ensure that listeners 
                                                 
4 https://www.YouTube.com/watch?v=tgfuaDS-S2c, and https://www.YouTube.com/watch?v= 
DgGTtGnYJRY. 
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get the message of gender stereotyping, but in my view also as a reaction to being 
taken seriously by Park Geun-hye’s campaign team, his next single, ‘Gentleman,’ 
offered an unmistakably crass representation of the same stereotyping, cast in what 
The Guardian reviewed as ‘a fairly standard-issue pop-dance single’ (12 April 
2013). ‘Gentleman’, though, arguably attempted to portray a more assertive 
masculinity, only for this to come across as misogyny, the result of which again 
reduced any sexual attraction. Hyuna was replaced by Ga-In of Brown Eyed Girls, 
and it was Ga-In rather than Psy who inhabited the video with a toned body, and 
who was unmistakably the overtly sexualized partner. She reprised the racy hip-
swaying choreography from her group’s ‘Abracadabra,’ in what retrospectively can 
now be seen as a brief detour on her way to the explicit violent-love ‘Fxxk U’ 
released early in 2014 – which in turn, it has been noted, was in its production 
influenced by China’s Jess Lee’s ‘Suffering’. 
Adorno’s theory of formulaic pop is, nonetheless, challenged by Psy in his 
approach to contemporary issues. The failure of the protagonist, and by extension, 
the emptiness of Korea’s consumption culture, mark out ‘Gangnam Style’, even 
though it is clear that Park Geun-hye’s campaign team used ‘Gangnam Style’ 
without referencing its subject matter. Psy had already proved himself to be 
controversial before ‘Gangnam Style’, particularly in the 2010 title track to his fifth 
album, ‘Right Now’. This tackled a different but related topic: the anguish of living 
in non-stop Seoul. While the video depicting the boredom of being stuck in a 
traffic jam, the Korean government reacted to the song’s lyrics. These, it decided, 
would encourage the youth to commit suicide, by jumping off the top of what since 
the late 1980s had been the tallest building in Seoul, the 63-storey Hanhwa City 
building on Yeouido. They slapped an R19 rating on ‘Right Now’. This kept it 
outside the teen-dominated charts, restricting its circulation: 
Namŭi ttŏgi tŏ k’ŭgo namŭi yŏjaga yeppŭgo naega hanŭn mot’ŭn’gôŏŭl 
wŏn’ga chom ŏsŏlp’ŭgo, 
Kŭrŏhtago chugŭm sudo kyesok idaero sal sudo sat’uriro tchat’uriro 
norŏnosŭl ppunigo… 
Right now! 180-do pyŏrhae tolgo tolgo chigŭmbut’ŏ mich’yŏ pollanda, 
Right now! 63 pildingwiro kŭrigo kŭ wiro chigŭmbut’ŏ ttwiŏ pollanda. 
They say that married women are larger and more pretty, and that the grass is 
greener on the other side, 
They say everything I do is kind of awkward, right, but does that mean I 
should die?  
Right now! Turn round and round through 180 degrees, crazy pollanda, 
Right now! On the 63 Building and up at the top, I’ve jumped, pollanda. 
Yonhap News reported on 20 September 2012 that a campaign was underway 
to lift the rating after the success of ‘Gangnam Style.’ The R19 restriction was said 
to be damaging Psy’s ability to emerge as a global superstar, since ‘Right Now’ 
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was expected to become a new hit as foreign fans searched online for more Psy 
tracks. As much as the success of ‘Gangnam Style’ was unanticipated, so it was 
celebrated, and policies quickly shifted: the government did indeed succumb, and 
removed the rating from ‘Right Now.’ Again, then, the lyrics and the video images 
were sidelined as other ends were championed. 
‘GANGNAM STYLE’: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 
As with much K-pop, the lyrics of ‘Gangnam Style’ include a smattering of 
English that provides decoration to the Korean narrative. The Korean was, of 
course, not understandable to many foreign consumers, although the Internet 
resonates with translations, and so the way that the song was consumed abroad 
relied less on lyrics than on other elements.  
‘Can anyone kill Gangnam Style?’ asked The Guardian online blog on 14 
November 2012. ‘It is the cringe-proof meme, the zombie meme, the meme that 
knows no shame. Quite possibly, it will be danced by grannies at weddings in 2030 
– the twenty-first-century equivalent of the conga line; the new Macarena.’ Why, 
Time magazine asked in October 2012, had the song not died after 57-year-old Eric 
Schmidt from Google danced to it? Why had it not died after so many others, from 
the boys of Eton to Madonna, Mayor of London Boris Johnson or the UN’s Ban 
Ki-moon danced to it? Some suffered as a consequence, and Time returned to the 
song on 3 April 2014, reporting how a policeman in Falmouth, England, one Gary 
Watts, had been sacked for dancing to the song in an effort to raise money for a 
dying child. Without doubt, the song was eminently mashable – once, in respect to 
global pop in the 1970s or 1980s, I would have referenced covers or remixes, but 
with the exception of ‘London Style’ (to be considered below), to do so hardly 
accounts for what happened in the parody world of ‘Gangnam Style’. But, not 
everybody got the joke. Some of the comments on The Guardian’s blog summed 
up a feeling of despair that grew as ‘Gangnam Style’ proved more and more 
impossible to escape from: ‘Shut up, South Korea!’ ‘I hate the song,’ ‘Of course 
America is singing the wrong song.’  
Internationally, an excerpt of the video first appeared on YouTube on 11 July 
2012. The full video was released four days later. The fuse of its explosion was lit 
by celebrity interest. Robbie Williams mentioned it on his personal blog on 28 
July; the next day it was tweeted by rapper T-Pain. On 30 July, Scooter Braun 
tagged the video, and tweeted to rhetorically ask why he had not already signed 
Psy: ‘HOW DID I NOT SIGN THIS GUY!?!??!’. Braun’s Raymond Braun Media 
Group soon concluded a full contract with Psy, placing the Korean alongside others 
he managed such as Justin Bieber and M.C. Hammer. The tipping point, to use 
Malcolm Gladwell’s (2000) term, was reached on 1 August, when the blog Daily 
Beast tagged ‘Gangnam Style’ as the video passed 10,000,000 YouTube views. A 
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month later, and after Katy Perry had shared the video with her myriad twitter 
followers, it had notched up 100,000,000 YouTube views. By the end of 
September, it occupied the second spot on the Billboard chart after an estimated 
34,000,000 Americans had listened to it on radio. Experiencing ‘Gangnam Style’ 
was, though, facilitated by social media more than radio, where its attraction came 
from its visual elements (dance, location, costume, action) as much as or more than 
the aural (song and lyrics). In this respect, it shifts our understanding of what the 
music industry is, away from the aural products celebrated by organizations such as 
the International Federation of Phonographic Industries (IFPI) and protected 
through copyright legislation, towards the individualized content that social media 
brings to today’s youth. Indeed, Psy lamented on BBC1 Radio on 5 October 2012: 
‘The problem is that my music video is more popular than I am.’ 
The distinction between commercialization and individualization reveals 
much about why ‘Gangnam Style’ was not what fans of K-Pop wanted. In a survey 
of Thai teens I conducted in February 2014 that I reported to the Third 
International Hallyu Workshop in Seoul on 7 March 2014, I asked about ‘Gangnam 
Style’. Responses included: ‘It’s in trend, but I don’t like it’; ‘The tune is catchy, 
but in the end it is not good to listen to, something more to enjoy when watching 
the music videos’; ‘Very catchy, but too commercial’; ‘Too mainstream’; ‘It was 
great until it went viral. Then it got annoying because it was everywhere’; ‘The 
composition is catchy, but when I looked up the meaning of the lyrics I didn’t like 
it much.’ The respondents to my survey comprised Thai teenagers who were 
studying Thai classical music and dance. They were not necessarily K-pop fans, 
but their reactions matched what I have now found repeated in each lecture and 
seminar I have given since ‘Gangnam Style’ exploded into our consciousness: in 
each presentation, my offer to play the ‘Gangnam Style’ video at the end has been 
met with a resounding ‘No!’ from K-Pop fans in my audiences. 
At issue here is the fact that fans abroad see K-pop as an Indie culture, a sub-
culture that is in some ways separate from the standard fare of Euro-American pop. 
It may typically be ‘bubble-gum’ pop, but fans abroad do not want to be told that it 
repackages the 1980s and 1990s boy bands and girl bands of Europe and America. 
This was clear in the 3 September 2012 Al-Jazeera program, ‘The Stream: K-Pop 
Diplomacy.’ As the program aired two tweets came in: ‘I don’t want it to get 
popular and famous, I dislike the hype [of fame];’ ‘I want to protect K-pop from 
the rest of the world.’ Indie culture provides individualization: its fans elect to be 
different, to choose music that they feel they identify with; they regard it as their 
right not to follow the mainstream and not to absorb what the profit-driven 
recorded music industry feeds them. 
To position ‘Gangnam Style’ in terms of its video images rather than its 
lyrics still accepts that it occupies different territory to the norms of contemporary 
K-pop. In its more recent iteration, commonly referred to as part of a second 
Korean Wave (K-Wave 2), K-pop has moved to tightly framed dance 
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choreographies. In doing so, its nature has changed. It has replaced the acted 
dramas of, say, g.o.d. (groove overdose) and H.O.T. (High Five of Teenagers), and 
the situated locations of the first Korean Wave (K-Wave 1), with blank stages. 
Today, these blank stages, even when framed as dressing rooms, rehearsal spaces, 
or urban streets, do not in themselves give any sense of being immutably Korea or 
Korean. The stages can be positioned within mass culture, within the discourse 
channeled from Adorno forwards, in a manner that ultimately reduces 
concentration on the aural. Liew Kai Khiun (2013) usefully explores the shift that 
has occurred as consumers have moved from ‘sound trackers’ in K-pop’s first 
iteration (K-Wave 1) for whom CDs and audio files supplemented by music videos 
provided the content, to ‘dance trackers’ in the second iteration (K-Wave 2). Where 
pop in K-Wave 1 was circulated largely through satellite and cable television,  
K-Wave 2 utilizes social networking sites. The shift is revealed in a set of paired 
attributes (sound tracker/dance tracker): adult/adolescent, text/body, 
television/YouTube, cognitive/physical, narrative/choreography, soundtrack/dance 
track, resolution/synchronization, moment/movement, tears/sweat, experience/ 
performance, and so on (Khiun 2013, 168). The blank stages of K-Wave 2 are, in 
official videos, filled by perfectly choreographed idol groups, each member 
manicured and pedicured, trimmed and enhanced by plastic surgery, costumed, 
made-up, and so on. Cover dances enacted by fans mirror these perfect 
performances and create unofficial video streams, the mirror being literal on 
official and semi-official pedagogical websites that give single-camera views of the 
dance. The requirement is that choreography must be replicable (Käng, 2012, 
20145), so that the memes create communities of fans, while social networking 
sites allow an individualized, private mimicry of commercialized, public 
circulation flows (after Jung & Hirata, 2012).  
‘Gangnam Style’ occupies different territory. Its images create a space 
beyond the lyrics, but in a K-Wave 1 music video way, rather than catering to the 
dance trackers of K-Wave 2. The memorable elements of the dance in ‘Gangnam 
Style’ – horse riding, the elevator scene, the yellow-clad comic, and so on – 
provide enough for celebrities to quickly master a few simple moves, but are 
insufficient content for a concentrated and satisfying cover dance. The memes, 
then, fail to harness the enthusiasm of fandom, and this is a further reason why 
‘Gangnam Style’ has not been sustained by K-pop’s fans. ‘Gangnam Style’ dance 
moves were certainly used in remarkable ways, but typically by those with little 
commitment to K-pop. Hence, the British tabloid newspaper, The Sun (16 October 
2012), told how washing hands to the song at Northampton General Hospital was 
promoted as part of its October 2012 Global Handwashing Day. Hence, again, 
Barbara O’Dair in Reader’s Digest reported that the American Council on Exercise 
estimated that doing the dance would burn between 150 and 200 calories per half-
                                                 
5 See also ‘The Secret Behind Kpop Choreography,’ at http://www.allkpop.com/article/ 
2009/09/the-secret-behind-kpop-choreography (last accessed 25 August 2014).  
11 Politics, Parodies, and the Paradox of Psy’s ‘Gangnam style’  23
hour, adding ‘I swear it feels like even more’.6 And, as it became apparent how 
many of the dance moves cried out to be mimicked by anybody and everybody, so 
hardened dance contesting K-Pop fans moved away. Again, and as I have already 
intimated above, some Asian American scholars protested that the portly figure of 
Psy fed into the stereotype of East Asian men (think, although unfairly, Kim Jong 
Il in the film Team America or, more recently, images of his son, Kim Jong Un). 
So, not only did the dance fail to woo dedicated K-pop fans, but the stereotypical Psy 
was not the Big Bang and Rain pin-ups that they wanted to swoon over. 
The images presented in the video were, and are, interpreted in different ways 
inside and outside Korea. Within Korea, they were social satire, highlighting the 
economic inequalities of the country, and, in an echo of ‘Right Now’, they shone a 
light on the shallowness of its highly urbanized life. The images offered multiple 
levels of the surreal in a way that readily allowed critics to claim absurdity: to 
Koreans, scenes shot near the western port city of Inch’ŏn suggested something 
other than the glitzy Gangnam suburbs south of the Han River in the capital, Seoul, 
and kept up the inside/outside allusion of the lyrics. Again, a very rare bright red 
Mercedes convertible car was in one scene placed in an apartment basement 
parking lot that was full of Hyundai and Kia sedans. And, the crudeness of the 
elevator scene, sunbathing in a sandy playground as kids passed by on their way 
from apartment to school, and rubbish blowing around all symbolized elements of 
the contemporary urban culture of consumption cast in cartoon-like ways. Near the 
opening of the video, Psy is gradually covered in feathers: although overstating the 
case, being tarred and feathered used to be a public humiliation in feudal Europe, 
and was infamously revived during the recent conflict in Northern Ireland. In each 
element, the absurdity mocked the perfection projected by bubble-gum K-Wave 2 
pop, focusing in on the façade that we normally encounter in pop videos but, 
uniquely, not attempting to hide it.  
Rather than absurdity, though, the success of ‘Gangnam Style’ within Korea 
implies that the visual images needed to be perceived as pastiche: the cultural 
mores specific to South Korea were recognized as something other than reality in 
the video, although the same images retained their representation of locality. To 
Koreans, then, ‘Gangnam Style’ was, and is, a parody of the excess that has 
famously characterized the Apkujŏng area of Gangnam since subway line No. 3, 
with its orange band of color, opened in the 1980s or, alternately, the area 
populated by the ‘orange tribe’ who were reported to be so rich they could afford 
luxurious fruit such as imported oranges while much of Korea was still struggling 
under the weight of change brought by rapid modernization. Today, the area 
remains the domain of affluence. It is purportedly home to 60% of Seoul’s doctors, 
amongst them the majority of Korea’s plastic surgeons. And it is, according to ‘The 
                                                 
6 http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/4591046/Handwash-style-NHS-do-Gangnam-spoof-to- 
show-people-how-to-wash-their-hands.html and http://www.rd.com/recommends/in-case-you-missed- 
it-gangam-style-goes-gangbusters/ (last accessed 25 August 2014). 
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Stream: K-Pop Diplomacy’, home to the families of 41% of the 2012 Korean 
intake to Harvard University.  
Outside Korea, the visual images of ‘Gangnam Style’ did not, and do not, 
have the same associations. In earlier times, it would have been expected and 
normal to point out the exoticism presented by both Psy and his song, referencing, 
typically, Said’s Orientalism (Said, 1978). Orientalism has been widely and 
variously applied to music, good examples being its use as a conceptual framework 
by many of the authors of chapters in Music and Orientalism in the British Empire, 
1780s–1940s (Clayton & Zon, 2007). Others would be tempted to see Psy as an 
extension of the model minority notion (after, for example, Lee 1986, Osajima 
2005 and Chou 2008). But, neither Orientalism nor the concept of the model 
majority seems to apply. As a term, ‘model minority’ was coined to describe 
Japanese Americans, a minority who had achieved greater success than their 
numbers would suggest likely when compared with the population average; from 
Japanese Americans it became part of discussions about other Asian American 
groups, including Korean Americans. Although the media continues to ascribe 
ethnic or racial identity, the assumption of difference appears outdated given the 
prominence of Asian Americans in cultural life, not least in music — be it 
classical, traditional, jazz, or pop (Wong, 2004; Yoshihara, 2007; Zheng, 2010). 
Certainly, Psy himself was ready to talk to commentators in English, removing any 
sense of distance. He was prepared to teach the dance moves to American stars (for 
which, see below), demonstrating that the moves had no explicit cultural 
distinctiveness. Parodies of the song also took away distance, replacing everything 
potentially foreign with the familiar. And, importantly, the images of Seoul 
presented in the ‘Gangnam Style’ video were, and are, no longer exotic to foreign 
audiences: apartment blocks, elevators, stabled horses, underground trains, a red 
Mercedes, and so on. In fact, some of the images, such as the red Mercedes and the 
stable, would have been more exotic to the Koreans who lived in those same 
apartment blocks and rode those same underground trains than they would be to 
non-Koreans from the affluent Global North. Neither singer nor song, then, 
mediated West and East; neither mediated ordinariness and otherness.  
In discussions of the global success of Japan, scholars have used the term 
mukokuseki to capture the non-assertive, neutral identity of Japanese animation and 
consumer products (e.g., Honda, 1994; Tsunoyama, 1995; Iwabuchi, 2002). Recent 
K-pop, likewise, has been critiqued — often in a negative way — as ‘de-
Koreanized’ (Shin, 2009: 513–5) and as a ‘culturally odorless … paradigm of 
transcultural hybridity’ (Jung 2011, 3). The same cannot be said to be strictly true 
of ‘Gangnam Style’, since the video and lyrics embedded meaning for Koreans if 
(but unlike Park Geun-hye’s campaign team) they watched and listened. The 
meaning shifted for non-Korean audiences, where, as a result, ‘Gangnam Style’ 
presented a pastiche of a very different nature. It then became mukokuseki, as a 
pastiche of many pop video clichés that were so familiar that understanding the 
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lyrics became largely irrelevant. Some critics spotted these clichés, and asked 
whether ‘Gangnam Style’ marked the beginning of a new attempt by Korean 
entertainment companies to make a splash worldwide, an effort to market 
themselves beyond their more established East Asian and Southeast Asian markets. 
They found ample confirmation when Psy signed to Scooter Braun, limiting the 
income that would be sent back to Korea for American exposure. Their suspicions 
were further confirmed when Psy collaborated with New York-based Jill Stuart on 
fashion, when he performed on the Ellen DeGeneres Show, when he ‘taught’ 
Britney Spears how to dance the song’s moves, and when he was a guest alongside 
Taylor Swift on ABC’s New Year’s Eve show at the end of 2012. When he became 
the face of Samsung as it marketed Korean white goods to Americans and 
Europeans, he was seen to have found a way to cash in on the familiarity brought 
by his YouTube success. He corroborated the Korean government’s widely 
reported policy brief that had it that a dollar spent on K-Pop would return five 
dollars in exports of cars, televisions and computers. 
The video, though, as Arwa Mahdawi in The Guardian, 24 September 2012, 
put it, was ‘born to spawn’. By effectively waiving copyright, or at least by not 
pursuing copyright infringers, Psy ensured that ‘Gangnam Style’ became, to quote 
Tim Byron writing in 2012 in The Vine,7 ‘…a piece of shared currency which can 
be taken as a known in a world which is increasingly nicheified.’ Byron’s 
perspective maps on to Arjun Appadurai’s (1996) notion of deterritorialization, 
where cultural flows are bilateral, enhanced by a shared technology that removes 
distance, making the local global. Equally, it confirms John Tomlinson’s (1999, 
2003) notion of reterritorialization, where the impetus towards globalization is 
counterpointed alongside localizing forces. This goes some way to explaining why 
success abroad created an argument for why ‘Gangnam Style’ should feature so 
prominently in Park Gun-hye’s inauguration at home, despite the messages 
embedded in both its lyrics and its visual images. And, just as Park’s campaign 
team were able to forget the North Korean mocking of the new president in a 
‘Gangnam Style’ parody about her father Park Chung Hee’s authoritarian 
leadership style that was uploaded onto the uriminzokkiri.com government website 
on 18 September 2012, it also gives the context in which so many of the myriad 
other parodies were able to bypass the messages of the song and its video.  
Exactly how many parodies of Psy’s song have been produced and uploaded 
to the Internet is difficult to determine. Typing ‘Gangnam Style parodies’ into 
www.google.com on 25 August 2014 gave 92,300 results, but I suspect this missed 
many. Parodies used ‘Gangnam Style’ as a vehicle. Through them, American 
farmers, Eton schoolboys, firemen, civil servants, computer nerds, politician 
avatars, Siberian Yeti imitators, and anybody else could project their own selves 
online. Wikipedia does a good job at this point, listing TV programs, films, sports 
                                                 
7 http://www.thevine.com.au/music/news/number-ones-psy-gangnam-style-20121002-250944. 
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events, celebrities, and the use of the song in robotics, applications and video 
games.8 In an age of social media, rather than the more established views on the 
mimetic (e.g., De Tarde, 1902; Benjamin, 1968; Fanon, 1952; Taussig, 1993), 
parodies of ‘Gangnam Style’ function as alternatives to twitter’s 140-characters or 
selfies; they are made and uploaded to YouTube ‘country-by-country, occupation-
by-occupation and school-by-school’ (Ono & Kwon, 2013: 209).  
Most of the parodies take away the critical edge of the original and focus on 
selfhood, imposing a new instant topicality that shares visual elements – locations, 
dance moves, relationships, and in-jokes – amongst the new country, the new 
occupation, or the new school. But, to some Koreans abroad locality has needed to 
be maintained, much as we would expect from the many published studies about 
cultural diasporas. This was the case with ‘London Style’, a parody co-produced by 
Kim Mose and Cho Hanbit with Korean, Japanese, and British students that was 
put online on 16 September 2012. ‘London Style’ mirrored Psy’s imaging and lip-
synched his lyrics, but portrayed daily life in London, from coffee shops to the 
subway, and from Big Ben to Harry Potter’s Platform 9¾ at Kings Cross Station. A 
follow-up video, in which Cho starred as an improvising pianist, ‘Gangnam Style 
Piano Tribute,’ took the respectful approach further.9 Key, then, was that both 
subsumed the gender stereotyping and lifestyle critique within what were designed 
to be tributes to Psy. Interviewed by Hyunseok Kwon (2014), Cho commented:  
Although our nationalities were different, we found a cultural common 
group in ‘Gangnam Style’. Because we worked on the video under such a 
premise, we could communicate together easily and passionately … We came 
to talk a lot about Korean culture. I came to know how foreign young people 
encountered K-Pop and how much they enjoyed it (March 2013).  
Still, though, the critical edge in the original was diluted in both of Kim and 
Cho’s parodies. Fun replaced irony, not least since those involved in ‘London 
Style’ were equally part of the social networking generation as were those involved 
in the myriad other parodies. In summary, then, the parodies of the song tended to 
absorb the inbuilt clichéd pastiche of the original, but then repositioned and 
reinterpreted the pastiche in a way that divorced it from the original. By doing so, 
‘Gangnam Style’ became embedded as part of our deterritorialized contemporary 
culture. It was also recast and reassembled for mass consumption, starting with a 
South Park Halloween party where GangnamStein replaces Frankenstein (‘A 
Nightmare on FaceTime’, 2012). It took its place in films such as This is the End 
and the documentary Linsanity, both of which were released in 2013. A character 
from the video, but not the song, danced in My Little Pony: Equestria Girls (2013), 
while the song and a cartoon version of Psy appeared in, and in adverts for, The 
Nut Job (2014). Doubtless, more will come in future years. 
                                                 
8 en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gangnam_Style_in_popular_culture (last accessed 25 August 2014).  
9 https://www.YouTube.com/watch?v=lMmyeXeXeK0 and https://www.YouTube.com/watch?v= 
X2ZAFmY2ESM. 
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‘Gangnam Style’ is no longer a video, no longer a song with meaningful 
lyrics, and no longer something with locality to the Korean peninsula. To conclude, 
I return to why Psy featured at Park Geun-hye’s inauguration in 2013. Locality was 
still recognized, but it was now reinterpreted in terms of a Korean product that had 
been successfully implanted around the world. This, after all, had been the aim 
since the Kim Dae Jung administration began to develop strategies to promote 
‘Cool Korea’ abroad at the end of the twentieth century, and ‘Gangnam Style’ 
confirmed the success of such strategies. ‘Gangnam Style’ contributed to the US$4 
billion that Korean Wave was expected to bring in to the country during 2012, but 
the reality is that it also did so indirectly, by contributing to offset profits from 
Korean technology and machinery exports attributable to the prominent place of 
soft culture abroad. The homespun Psy offered a welcome alternative to harnessing 
foreign song writers and industry insiders to help sell K-pop abroad (such as 
will.i.am for 2NE1, Kanye West for JYJ, Japanese song writers for Big Bang, and 
Dominique Rodriguez for Girls’ Generation). And so it was that the international 
success of ‘Gangnam Style’ was and continues to be celebrated. But, in the 
recognition of success, ears and eyes were and are closed, so that the song’s knowable 
lyrics and the video’s familiar locations were, and are, simply, ignored. The ultimate 
paradox, then, is that the success of ‘Gangnam Style’ removed its identity. 
In the future, readers may be able to add a coda to this paper, for the song’s 
success is likely to lead to additional developments at home in Korea. A report in 
the Korea Times on 1 October 2014 noted that foreign tourists to the district of 
Gangnam shot up from 850,000 in 2012 to more than five million in 2013, 
purportedly primarily because of the song10. A Korean Wave Street may one day 
become a reality, even if, as Visit Seoul has it11, it will be a street that houses the 
offices of three of the major music-oriented companies, S.M. Entertainment, JYP 
Entertainment and Cube Entertainment, but not, paradoxically, Psy’s YG 
Entertainment. The street, then, is ironically likely to feature the K-pop of others, 
rather than be a celebration of ‘Gangnam Style’. 
                                                 
10 Available at: www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2014/10/116_165556.html (accessed 
1 October 2014). 
11 Notwithstanding efforts to create similar places in Seocho-gu and north of the river… For 
the Gangnam ‘K-pop Road’, see: http://www.visitseoul.net/en/article/article.do?_method=view&m= 
0005001003003&p=&art_id=60265&lang=en (last accessed 16 April 2014). 
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